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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is taken pursuant
to Rule 14 Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals from the final
Order of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah as
provided

in section 35-2-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

On August 1 2 , 1987 a hearing was held to resolve the
matter of occupational disability before The Industrial
Commission of Utah regarding Mr. Robert Jacobsen.
Denial of Motion for Appointment of additional

doctor

to Medical Panel was passed by the Industrial Commission of
Utah on June 23, 1987.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed on
January 11, 1988 as ordered by Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.
Objections to the above findings of fact was sent to
the Industrial Commission of Utah on January 27, 1988 by Mr.
Robert Jacobsen.
The Industrial Commission of Utah issued an order to
deny motion

for review on March 24, 1988.

The Commission

made claim that "the only issue on review was the applicant's
entitlement to the full impairment rated" and did not give
fair consideration to the above Objections to Findings of Fact.
The Utah Court of Appeals issued an Order granting extension of time on May 19, 1988.
L. Zane Gill, Attorney for the plaintiff withdrew as
counsel on May 25, 1988.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Appellants submit that the sole issue for review is
whether there is evidence in the record
sion of the Industrial

to support the deci-

Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellants accept the fact that by letter dated May 2,
1986 (Shirl L. Maxfield, Chief) Salt Lake County Fire Dept.,
(see addendum P - l ) , Placed the appellant on the role of
medical retirement.

This action was taken eventhough the

appellant performed duties as an administrative fire investigator for two years prior.

Chief Maxfield did this since

Mr. Jacobsen if exposed to the rigors of firefighting

could

according to Dr. Attilio Renzette result in serious consequences.
In a letter to Mark Wainwright, Assistant Attorney General,
Barbara Elicerio States "This case involves the Commission's,
affirmance on review of an Administrative Law Judge's decision
apportioning

impairment resulting from asthma partially to pre-

existing conditions

(for which there is no contribution by the

Second Injury-Fund per the Administrative Law Judge's interpretation of the Occupational Disease Act..)" (Please see addendum P - 2 ) .
It is the request of the appellant to receive full compensation
for the exposure received as a firefighter.

It is further the

request of the appellant that this court make the interpretation
the the Law Judge erred - and the pre-existing conditions do fall
under the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act which does
address the particular

issue.
2

The parties do not dispute that Mr, Jacobsen did have
aggravation to an asthmatic condition but the appellant

does

need clarification that was not given in the above mentioned
Course of Proceedings and disposition of this claim to date.
As statement of fact the below information is reviewed

as it

is more than only a request for entitlement to the full impairment rated.
27, 1 9 8 8 ) :

(Per the objection to Findings of Fact dated

January

Please see addendum P-3 to 11 Findings of Fact/and

Objections to Findings of Fact P-12 to 17.
1.

In findings of fact

(Page 1) Dr. Bronsky stated

that

Dr. Fink's opinion should be more significant than his own.
2.

Mr. Jacobsen applied for administrative duties when

Dr. Renzetti indicated

that his condition could become severe

if exposed to further smoke.

Mr. Jacobsen had not been around

cats other than occasionally-however Mr. Jacobsen did work as
a firefighter for 15 years.

Dr. Bronsky and Dr. Renzetti both

agreed that in all probability the appellants exposure to smoke
caused

his asthmatic chronic problem.

On page 3 Dr. Fink also

states " I , therefore, am of the opinion that your

progressive

pulmonary impairment was induced by your recurrent exposure and
inhalation of smoke and noxious materials in your occupation.
While it is likely that your asthma was also initially

induced

by cat exposure I believe it would not have progressed to
disability had you not been a firefighter."
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smoke inhalation that did accelerate, severely-contribute to
the disability, aggravate and prolong the appellants condition.
The Industrial Commission states "that the applicant's argument
would be a logical one if the issue were d isability.
(U.C.A.

(Further)-

35-2-50) that only that impairment resulting from occupa-

tional aggravation can be compensated."

The fact is that medical-

ly the asthma and its inducement by smoke and cat dander was not
developed and that only work as a firefighter furthered the asthma
process and progressed the condition to a very chronic state.
ARGUMENT
THE FACTS FOUND BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND ADOPTED BY
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE NOT FAIR OR REASONABLE AND SHOULD
BE SET ASIDE.
Appellant argues that there is nothing in the record to support
the administrative law judge's conclusion of law that the rated
disability in full did not result as the cause from the occupational exposures to fighting fire and that medically smoke inhalation did cause and develop the applicants disability to the full
level of 30% whole man permanent partial disability.
As the issue is one of "aggravation" versus "inducement"
the administrative law judge def inately found the cause to be
occupationally oriented and further develop into a chronic state.
The disease to Mr. Jacobsen's lungs did develop and cause the
impairment rendered at 30% by Dr. Renzetti, and agreed to by Dr.
5

Bronsky, and also supported by Dr. Fink.
The law of this state is

that the courts may not

weight evidence to determine whether the finding is supported
by sufficient and competent evidence.

RE:

Ogden Union Rail-

way & Depot Co. v. Industrial Commission, 85 Utah 124, 38 P.2d
766 (1934); Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d
(Utah 1981).

888

(The ABOVE cases and others will be listed per

alphabetical listing after arguements).
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

is documented below to explain

why the appellant is entitled to full compensation:
Addendum P-28, paragraph 5.

Letter of Dr. Jordan Fink

" I , therefore, am of the opinion that your progressive impairment was induced by your recurrent exposure and inhalation of
smoke and noxious materials in your occupation. While it is
likely that your asthma was also

initially induced by cat ex-

posure, I believe it would not have progressed
had you not been a firefighter.

to disability

Further, although it cannot

be determined with certainty, the early inhalation of smoke, etc.,
may just as likely damaged your'airways so that your

sensitivity

to cat and subsequent asthma was brought out clinically."
Addendum P-31, paragraph 1/2. Letter of Dr. Edwin Bronsky
-

"it was impossible to attribute his asthma to any specific

chemicals 11

(as it is rediculous to expect firefighters to log

the content of materials burned at the scene of a fire)
on the other hand, could not rule out the possibility

ff

, or

that asthma

was induced by specific chemical contact in the course of his fire
fighting.

IMPORTANT:

(Addendum P-30, Para. 3 ) .

cat reaction CANNOT be considered
It has been well established

Dr. Bronsky states "The

relevant as. the underlying cause.

in the literature that contact with

isocyanates and other chemicals can induce asthma and that repeated

exposure to these chemicals sould set up a continuing

and even permanent disability after the exposure has been terminated if that exposure has been long and intense enough to set up
the original and continuing reaction.
January 28, 1988,

by Dr. Bronsky).

(Addendum P-32, Letter of
"I have no position

that

disagrees with the disability given by Dr. Attilio D. Renzetti" 30% permanent partial impairment of the whole man.
(Addendum P-33, Page 2 of a report to Judge Richard
Sumsion, dated September 17, 1986).

G.

Dr. Renzetti states "I did

indicate to Mr. Jacobsen that specialists in allergy are more
expert in the field of asthma and its causes and I might defer
to a well qualified

experienced allergist in responding to

questions of cause and effect such as you have raised.

I particu-

larly mentioned Dr. Bronsky, who is an acknowledged expert

allergist

in our community and whose opinion might be helpful in this
particular case."
,f

(Addendum P-34, Dr. Renzetti).

his condition has worsened

(Line 9) -

so that he has now become what we

term a steroid dependent asthmatic

which means he requires

daily cortisone-type treatment in order to keep his asthma under
control.

Thus, we would classify him as being a severe asthmatic. ff

"With regard to Mr. Jacobsen 1 s occupation, I would consider him
TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED from his occupation as a firefighter.

I would consider him permanently partially disabled
7

due

to his underlying chronic pulmonary disease.

His symptoms

- indicate a partial impairment of 30% of the whole man."

NOTE:

CASES REFERENCED ALPHBETICALLY

Addendum Pages 35-37,

(Please see copies in

Nolan Marshall is placed P-38-45 due

to length.)
Appellant argues that referenced cases support the
above mentioned

information and evidence.

The factual record is more than adequate to set aside
the decision of the Industrial Commission.

As stated

in this

brief it is known that firefighting and smoke inhalation and
isocyanates or other chemicals are known triggers of asthma
and are particular

industrial problems, and that, and

these

noxious materials will continue to trigger, perpetuate, and
intensify asthma.

This court should reverse the decision of

the Commission.
CONCLUSION
The primary issues raised in this case are whether the
appellant is entitled to full disability benefits, and, if the
administrative law judge

misinterpreted medical

information

and misjudged the amount of permanent partial impairment due
the appellant.

8

Further, the Industrial Commission upheld

this administrative

law judge's decision.
Richard E. Holloway v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.3d

31

(Utah 1986)
An administrative law judge ruling of "no accident"
was reversed and remanded per the Allen case, where a truck
driver developed

low back pain when he crouched to examine

a truck tire, with an indication that when examining

the ques-

tion of pre-existing conditions, the condition need:not be
obvious or symptomatic.
Kaiser Steel Corporation v. <- Industrial Commission of
Utah and Louis R. Chavez, 709 P.2d
The court interpreted
U.C.A.

1168 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) :

the language in Section

35-1-69

(pre-1981) concerning what constitutes a "substantially

greater" impairment

to mean anything which is measurable and

thus trigger Second Injury Fund participation.
The appellant make claim that the following cited
in the Occupational Disease Disability Compensat ion

laws

(Worker's

Compensation Act) support total award of benefits:
35-2-12.

(a) "Disablement" means -

(e) "Partial Perm-

anent Disability," as herein used - 35-2-26. Occupational
diseases
ment" (2).

-

Proximate causation.

"fairly traced to employ-

35-2-27.(28) 'other disease' (A) - ( E ) . -

35-2-56

(3).

35-2-56.

"it shall be the duty of the Second

Injury

Fund provided for by section 35-1-68

( 1 ) , not to exceed

$1,000 for use in rehabilitation and training11 - for an
individual unable to obtain employment

in his usual occupa-

tion.
The appellant would request this court to clarify
if a greater payment could be made as the discrepancy is
dramitic between occupational disease and worker's compensation since the terms accident and disease may be one of the
same.

(Example:

30% permanent partial disability under

occupational disease would pay $6078.
tion 30% would pay $20124.

Under worker's compensa-

Further if total disability

does

exist now or in the future it is still total disability. In
addition in this case a fire fighter is placed in a "accident"
situation when exposed to noxious material.

Does this not

constitue a accumulation of accident and exposures

INSTEAD

eventhough the disease is 1 at the end of determination for
disability?
There is credible evidence in the record to dismiss the
decision of the Industrial Commission,

The decision of the

Industrial Commission should be set aside by this court.
Dated this 19th day of July, 1988.

Robert JaccwBen
Pro se
8258 Williamsburg Park Circle
Sandy, Utah 84070

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four copies of this Brief of
Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid this 19th day of July,
1988 to:
Mr. Jay Stone
Salt Lake County
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
FIRE AND PARAMEDIC DIVISIONS
Administration
#51 West 3900 South, Suite A
Murray, Utah 84107

263-5399

COMMISSIONER

M. TOM SHIMIZU
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS

DONALD G. SPENCER
Professional Engineer
County Engineer

IRE DIVISION

May 2 , 1986

FIRE CHIEF

SHIRL L. MAXFIELD
ive Officer
roas J. Sadler

rt Services
) J. McMillan

Mr. C. Robert Jacobsen, Fire Fighter
Salt Lake County Fire Department
8258 S Williamsburg Park
Sandy, UT 84070

e Delivery
ert W. Timmerman

Dear Fire Fighter Jacobsen,

al Coordinator

I have received a letter from your personal physician, Dr. Attilio
Renzette, Jr. indicating that due to health problems you are no longer
able to discharge the duties of a fire fighter.

id B. Lehnhof

He indicates possible serious consequences should you be exposed to the
rigors of fire fighting.
Therefore, I have no choice but to place you on '•compensated illness
status.•• Our records indicate that on April 15, 1986 you have accrued
209 hours of such compensation.
I urge you to make the necessary arrangements to seek medical retirement
with the Utah State Firemen1s Retirement Board. Doing this at your
earliest convenience will assist you in avoiding a long period of time
without compensation.
In order that we might assist you in this matter, please sign the
attached release for your medical records to Dr. Harry Gibbons, County
Director of Health.

Sincerely,

%k//:m«fti

*?

•J

SHIRL L. MAXFIELD, CHIEF
Salt Lake County Fire Dept.
bk
cc:

File
County Attorney's Office

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Norman H Bangerter
Governor

Stephen M Hadle>
fhairmai

160 East 300 South
P O Box 510910

Gordon Unnett

Salt Lake City Utah 84151-0910

Executive Director

Toll free 1 -800-426-0667

Mark Wainwright
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

L L Nielsen
Commissioner

May 16, 198S

John Florez
Commissioner

Re: Robert Jacobsen v. Salt Lake
County and Industrial Commission
of Utah, Commission Case No,
86000562, Court of Appeals No,
880266CA

Dear Mr, Wainwright:
The record for the above-referenced case has been referred to the Court of
Appeals. This case involves the Commission^ affirmance on review of an Administrative Law Judge's decision apportioning impairment resulting from asthma
partially to pre-existing conditions (for which there is no contribution by the
Second Injury Fund per the Administrative Law Judgers interpretation of the Occupational Disease Act) and partially due to industrial exposure to smoke as a
firefighter. As result of no Second Injury Fund contribution for a pre-existing
impairment aggravated by an occupational exposure, the applicant was compensated
for only a portion of his overall impairment due to asthma. The applicant appeals
seeking full compensation for his total overall impairment due to the occupationally
aggravated asthma. The applicant is apparently pursuing this appeal pro se.
The Industrial Commission is aligned with Salt Lake County on appeal. At the
Industrial Commission, Salt Lake County was represented by Jay Stone, Deputy
County Attorney, 2001 South State, S3400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200. I
am presuming he will also be handling the appeal on this case. Mr. Stone is
familiar with the Utah workers compensation laws and this case and should need
NO assistance on appeal. If there any questions regarding this appeal, I can be
contacted at 530-6822.
BY DIRECTION:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

£<S~>^A

_

iarbara Elicerio
Legal Counsel
cc: Jay Stone, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 South State, S3400, SLC, UT 84190-1200
vRobert Jacobsen, 8528 Williamsburg Park Circle, Sandy, UT 84070
Timoth Shea, Clerk of the Court, Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, SLC,
UT 84102

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No:

ROBERT JACOBSEN,

86000562

*

Applicant,

*
*

VS.
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

Defendant.

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*
*

AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room #334, Utah Industrial Commission, 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 12, 1987 at 1:00
o'clock p.m. Said hearing was pursuant to order and notice
of the Industrial Commission.

BEFORE:

Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Byron Fisher,
Attorney at Law. Mr. Fisher subsequently withdrew and the
applicant is now represented by L. Zane Gill, Attorney at
Law.
The Defendants were represented by Jay Stone, Deputy County
Attorney.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the medical questions and issues
were submitted to a special medical panel appointed by the Administrative Law
Judge. The medical panel report was received by the Commission and copies
were distributed to all of the parties. No significant objections to the
medical panel report were filed although the applicant did file a Motion for
appointment of an additional doctor to the medical panel after the original
report had been submitted seeking to have Dr. Jordan Fink appointed as a
member of the panel. Dr. Fink is Chief of the Allergy-Immunology Section at
the Medical College of Wisconsin and is a recognized expert in his field. The
Administrative Law Judge granted an extension of time for the submission of
Dr. Fink*s opinion relative to Mr. Jacobsen's claim but denied the Motion
seeking his appointment as a member of the medical panel.
Applicant
requested
that the hearing
be reopened to allow
consideration of additional evidence and information that was not inquired
into at the time of the hearing. As an alternative procedure, counsel for the
applicant suggested that Mr. Jacobsen be allowed to supplement his testimony

ROBERT JACOBSEN
FINDINGS OF FACT
PAGE TWO

by way of affidavit subject to counter affidavit and/or cross-examinations
through a deposition. The later procedure was approved and the affidavit of
the applicant was filed on September 14, 1987. A copy of the affidavit was
submitted to counsel for the defendant on September 18, 1987 and Mr. Stone
responded by letter dated October 8, 1987 indicating he was prepared to submit
the matter without cross-examining the applicant or presenting evidence in
conflict with that already contained in the record. Mr. Stone also submitted
a letter from Salt Lake County Fire Chief, Larry C. Hinman regarding the
affidavit of Mr. Jacobsen but did so by way of explanation rather than counter
affidavit acknowledging the letter was not sworn to. With the file in this
position, the parties have deemed the matter submitted and have advised the
Administrative Law Judge that they would await a decision in this matter.
The issues to be decided in this case are as follows:
1.

Does the applicant have an occupational disease compensable
under the provisions of Section 35-2-27(28)?

2.

If so, did the applicant comply with all of the filing
requirements of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law?

3.

If so, does the applicant have a rateable permanent partial
disability?

4.

If so, what compensation is the applicant entitled to under
Section 35-2-56?

5.

If compensation is payable, is the award subject to a
proportional offset under the provisions of Section 35-2-50?

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The applicant was employed by the Salt Lake County Fire Department
from 1971 to 1986. The first years of his employment were served as a fire
fighter. In the late 1970*s the applicant started to develop respiratory
symptoms prompting him to seek medical attention. Between April of 1979 and
September of 1981 the applicant was under the care of Dr. Alfred Albunza, a
specialist in pulmonary medicine. From and after November 1 of 1982, the
applicant continued under the care of Dr. Attillio D. Renzetti, Jr., Professor
of Medicine and Chief of the Division of Respiratory, Critical Care and
Occupational (Pulmonary) Medicine at the University of Utah Medical Center.
As a result of Dr. Renzetti*s recommendations, the applicant obtained a

ROBERT JACOBSEN
FINDINGS OF FACT
PAGE THREE

position with the Fire Department as an investigator so as to be removed from
the possibility of smoke inhalation during fire fighting. Dr. Renzetti was
and is of the opinion that the applicant was suffering from bronchial asthma
to a severe degree and that if he continued to be exposed to smoke from a fire
he would run the risk of developing severe and potentially life threatening
asthmatic attacks. It is Dr. Renzetti1s opinion that Mr. Jacobsen1s pulmonary
impairment is only attributable to his underlying bronchial asthma and he is
unable to attribute any portion of it to an industrial component with any
medical or scientific justification.
This opinion is expressed in Dr.
Renzetti*s letter addressed to the the Administrative Law Judge dated August
28, 1986. In the same letter, Dr. Renzetti states: "I do not know who advised
Mr. Jacobsen that his pulmonary problem "might have been occupationally
caused." I certainly did not advise him such but in fact informed him that
his asthma could not be attributed in a causal fashion to his fire fighting
but rather that fire fighting would lead to exacerbation of his disease. I
think it is important to point out that such exacerbations due to exposure to
smoke would be temporary and amenable to therapy.
Perhaps he had
misinterpreted my remarks in this regard. It is clear from Dr. Renzetti*s
reports that bronchial asthma is not an occupational disease so far as the
cause of the disease is concerned.
It is equally clear that asthma is
severely aggravated by smoke inhalation necessitating the removal of the
ajjpiicant from work which involves exposure to smoke from fires. Dr. Renzetti
saw no problem in the applicants continued employment in an administrative
position for the Fire Department which did not subject him to exposure to the
smoke of fire fighting.
The applicant was given a medical retirement effective May 1, 1986.
The reason given was that even though he was then employed in an
administrative position that he was clearly physically capable of performing,
he nevertheless was required to step in as a fire fighter if called to do so.
Because his asthma condition prevented him from considering the possibility,
he was dismissed from the force by an involuntary medical retirement. The
dismissal of the applicant from the Fire Department is not a matter which is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Workers Compensation Division. In this
regard, the Administrative Law Judge can only comment and observe that the
reason given for the applicants termination and medical retirement seems
totally contrary to common sense and would appear to be a flimsy explanation
for some undisclosed underlying reason.
The Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law places upon any claimant
a difficult burden of proof. Rarely can a given exposure be duplicated with
any degree of certainty at a subsequent time. It seems only common sense that
certain allowances must necessarily be made in order to effectuate the
purposes of the Occupational Disease law. The applicant has attempted to
document his exposure as accurately as possible by the submission of the
affidavit referred to above. With certain minor exceptions identified by the
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letter from Fire Chief Larry Hinman, the bulk of the applicant's affidavit
would appear to reflect the best evidence available relative to the
applicant's exposure as a Fire Fighter. Accordingly, with the exceptions
noted, the Administrative Law Judge adopts the affidavit of the applicant by
reference as his own findings of fact as though fully set forth. In doing so,
the Administrative Law Judge recognizes that some of these facts are mere
impressions or opinions without any appreciable degree of objectivity and this
directly relates to the weight and sufficiency of such evidence when used to
support the applicant's claim for compensation.
The Administrative Law Judge appointed Dr. Edwin A. Bronsky to
perform an impartial evaluation of the medical aspects of this case. Dr.
Bronsky was appointed primarily upon the recommendations of Dr. Renzetti who
suggested that a specialist in the treatment of allergies might be best
qualified to evaluate this case and he said that Dr. Bronsky was a recognized
expert in this field in this community. Dr. Bronsky had never served in this
capacity before and this resulted in a few irregularities with respect to his
evaluation of the applicant. The first irregularity was by way of undertaking
a certain amount of treatment of Mr. Jacobsen as contrasted to an evaluation.
When Mr. Jacobsen was first seen by Dr. Bronsky he was quite ill and this
necessitated the prescription of many medications before certain tests could
be performed. Finally, Dr. Bronsky was able to adequately test the applicant
in December of 1986. Dr. Bronsky states,
"He was tested for a panel of allergens and was found to be
essentially
a non-allergic
individual
except
for a
significant reaction to cat dander.
This testing in
general did not confirm that he had significant allergic
diathesis Which would have contributed to his asthma. The
cat
reaction
cannot be considered
relevant as the
underlying cause for his asthma and its continuing problem
I have suggested that Mr. Jacobsen contact Dr. Jordan Fink,
an expert in occupational asthma at the University of
Wisconsin at Milwaukee. It is possible that this expert,
one of several in the country, could actually test him for
isocyanates or other chemicals to determine the extent of
their participation in his asthma.
I agree with the
sentiment of Dr. Renzetti . . . that it was impossible to
attribute his asthma to any specific chemicals and, on the
other hand, could not rule out the possibility that asthma
was induced by specific chemical contact in the course of
his fire fighting. It has been well established in the
literature
that
contact with
isocyanates
and other
chemicals can induce asthma and that repeated exposure to
these chemicals could set up a continuing and even
permanent disability after the exposure has been terminated
if that exposure has been long and intense enough to set up
the original and continuing reaction."
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Dr. Fink was contacted by the applicant and he recommended that a med
line search be undertaken to obtain literature on the subject of the effects
of smoke and toxic gases etc. on the respiratory tract. Applicant did this
and submitted copies of a number of articles by various experts in the field.
The applicant provided Dr. Fink with certain background information and Dr.
Fink expressed his opinion in a letter addressed to the applicant dated August
14, 1987. He states in the conclusion:
The experience of physicians in our institution is that
some fire fighters may develop persistent hyperactive
airways disease following smoke inhalation.
In reviewing your records, I am of the opinion that you
have had allergic respiratory disease with asthma related
to cat dander sensitivity. However, during the time of
those symptoms, you were also exposed to smoke and noxious
materials in your occupation.
It is unlikely that cat
induced asthma would progress to steroid dependent asthma
(you have not indicated whether or not you have had a cat
at home during that time) and you were exposed on a regular
basis in your occupation to materials which can induce
hyperactive airways and progressive pulmonary function
deterioration.
I, therefore, am of the opinion that your progressive
pulmonary impairment was induced by your recurrent exposure
and inhalation of smoke and noxious materials in your
occupation. While it is likely that your asthma was also
initially induced by cat exposure, I believe it would not
have progressed to disability had you not been a fire
fighter. Further, although it cannot be determined with
certainty, the early inhalation of smoke etc. may just as
likely damage your airways so that your sensitivity to cat
and subsequent asthma was brought out clinically.**
The Administrative Law Judge has difficulty in adopting the findings of Dr.
Fink as his own because of the many assumptions of fact which cannot be
objectively documented. One must first accept the assumptions that many of
the fires fought by the applicant involved the inhalation of smoke, toxic
gases, isocyanates, etc. that caused the applicant's bronchial asthma. Dr.
Renzetti, on the other hand, could find no medical or scientific justification
to attribute the cause of the bronchial asthma to the applicant's employment
even though the asthma itself was clearly aggravated by the applicant's
industrial exposures. Of some significance is Dr. Renzettifs statement that
the applicant's mother has also been a patient of his and she is also
asthmatic.
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Without regard to cause, Dr. Renzetti rated the applicant's pulmonary
impairment at 30% of the whole man. This included his underlying chronic
pulmonary disease consisting of the bronchial asthma, extensive cystic changes
and
coccidiodomycosis.
Viewing
the
evidence
in
its
entirety,
the
Administrative Law Judge finds that most if not all of the applicant's
pulmonary impairment is not the result of any occupational disease even though
his duties as a fire fighter may well have aggravated the underlying condition
to some extent. This being the case, the provisions of Section 35-2-50 are
applicable. Section 50 provides that: ". . . Where disability or death from
any other cause not itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated
or any wise contributed by an occupational disease, the compensation payable
under this act shall be reduced and limited to such proportion only of the
compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole
cause of the disability or death, as such occupational disease as a causative
factor bears to all the causes of such disability or death." As noted above,
Dr. Renzetti found no medical or scientific justification for attributing any
of the applicant's impairment to an occupational disease. On the other hand,
all of the doctors who have examined the applicant or who have examined his
records have acknowledged the possibility of an aggravation of his pulmonary
disorder as a result of his fire fighting activities. For lack of any
objective criteria on which to do so, the Administrative Law Judge is willing
to arbitrarily assume that 10% or 1/3 of the applicant's impairment is
reasonably attributable to the aggravation of the applicant's underlying
pulmonary disorder as a result of his fire fighting activities.
Section 35-2-56 mandates as a condition for the payment of benefits
for permanent partial disability that: "(b) No compensation shall be paid
unless such partial disability results within two years prior to the day upon
which claim for such compensation was filed with the Industrial Commission of
Utah, (c) No compensation shall be paid unless the partial disability results
within two years of the last day in which the employee was exposed to the
occupational disease." The applicant filed his claim with the Commission on
May 15, 1986 and subsequently filed an amended claim on May 21, 1986. He took
sick leave from April 25, 1986 through May 31, 1986 but the record does not
disclose if he was disabled during that period of time. Furthermore, the
record does not disclose the last day on which the employee was last exposed
to the occupational disease. Presumably, in this context, the statute in
referring to exposure to the occupational disease is referring to the last
harmful exposure .which in this case would be the applicant's fire fighting
activities in which he was exposed to smoke, toxic gases or isocyanates.
Applicant makes reference in his affidavit to having been exposed to heavy
smoke on July 14, 1980. He makes reference to another fire in South Salt Lake
Which presumably was subsequent to the July 14, 1980 fire inasmuch as it
appears subsequent in his affidavit.
Although there is room for doubt,
presumably, the applicant has met the filing requirements of the law.
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Compensation payable to the' applicant under the foregoing assumptions
is governed by Subsection (4) of\35-2-56^/ Compensation is determined by
multiplying the percentage of partiaTTrerPmanent disability resulting from the
occupational disease by 104 weeks times the employee*s compensation rate per
week.
The maximum rate of compensation at the time of the applicants
disablement was $215.00 per week. Therefore, compensation is computed based
on the following formula: .10 X $215.00 X 104 weeks = $2,236.00. Because the
compensation does not exceed 20 weeks, it is payable in a lump sum.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

In awarding some benefits in this case, the Administrative Law Judge
is aware of the Supreme Court* s recent decision in the case of Tisco
Intermountain v. the Industrial Commission filed September 29, 1987 No. 20913
in which the Court stated:
"Policy considerations
in workers compensation
cases
dictate that statutes should be liberally construed in
favor of an award. However, policy considerations have no
application in the absence of any evidence to support an
award, nor can they be used to controvert the clear meaning
of the statutory requirements upon which an award must be
based.
In the instant case, it clearly appears that the award of
benefits is unsupported by substantial credible evidence,
and that is the standard this Court must apply.
In
awarding benefits, the Administrative Law Judge also
ignored compentent medical evidence that negatives the
finding of medical causation."
In awarding benefits herein, the Administrative Law Judge believes
there is sufficient compentent medical evidence for making the award but
allows for the fact that such evidence is at best controversial and that the
percentage of impairment deemed industrial is clearly arbitrgj?yr^ However,
there appears to be no way to make an allocation of the partial impairment on
a medical or scientific basis, hence the arbitrary allocation.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant Salt Lake County Fire
Department pay to Robert Jacobsen the sum of $2,236.00 as permanent partial
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disability of 10% of the whole person attributable to aggravation or
exacerbation of his underlying pulmonary disorder, the aggravation or
exacerbation thereof being attributable to his fire fighting activities while
employed by the Salt Lake County Fire Department.
This amount shall be
payable in a lump sum, less attorney*s fees, plus interest at the rate of 8%
per annum from and after May 1, 1986.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salt Lake County Fire Department pay one
third of the applicant* s medical expenses attributable to his pulmonary
disorder; these expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. The remaining two thirds which is
presumed attributable to the underlying non-occupational pulmonary disease, is
payable by the applicant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant Salt Lake County Fire
Department pay to L. Zane Gill, applicants attorney, the sum of $447.20.-No
portion of the fee is awarded to applicant*s prior attorney, Byron Fisher,
because of the very limited fee awarded in this matter.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (IS) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Richard G. Sums ion
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of January 11, 1988.
ATTEST:

Linda J.^Strasburg
Commission Secretary

^ '
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Richard G. Sumsion
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South, P.O. 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
RE:

ROBERT JACOBSEN

*
*

Applicant,

OBJECTIONS TO:
FINDINGS OF FACT

vs :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendant.

*

AND ORDER OF:
January 11, 1988.

Dear Honorable Judge Sumsion:

(Page 1, Hearing)

The correct date of the hearing was 8-12-86.

(Page 2) Information obtained from Chief Hinman should not be a
Line 7
1 consideration in this case. First, it has been received
improperly. Second, Chief Hinman wasn't involved in this case at
time of occurrence and was unaware of the issues. Third, applican
has not seen nor been allowed to comment on the context of the Chi
reply.
(Page 2 ) , last line. Dr. Renzetti made the applicant aware of the
hazards associated with his medical condition and his occupation.

ROBERT JACOBSEN
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT
PAGE TWO

The applicant made the decision to apply for an administrative
position in which Dr. Renzetti provided his condoning support.
(Page 3 , 5, and 6.) The Law Judge makes reference to the opinion of Dr. Renzetti throughout the Findings of Fact. With all
due res pect the issu es in this case are outside the area of his
experti se as pointed out by Dr. Renzetti in his letter of 9-17-86
to the Law Judge,
f,
I did indicate to Mr . Jacobsen that specialists in allergy
are mor e expert in t he fi eld of asthma and its causes and I might
defer t o a well qual if ied experi enced allergist in responding to
ques tio ns of cause a nd ef feet su ch as you have raised.
I particularly mentioned Dr. Bron sky who is an acknowledged expert in our
communi ty and whose op ini on migh t be helpful in this particular
case . Therefore, wi th re gard to this case, the "Findings of Fact"
relativ e to the issu es st ated on page two and in this case should
reflee t the opinion of th e Medic al Panel and not Dr. Renzetti. Dr,
Bronsky is the "well qual ified e xpert" that Dr. Renzetti deferred
to in " this particua Ir ca se". ( Please reference your letter of 106-1986 for further c larif ication
(Page 3) I There is little doubt tha t the expo sures suffered by the
Line 13 | applicant have exacerbate d the appl icants 1 condition as
that
all physicians have agreed.
Howeve r the Law Judge suggests
"his asthma could not be attributed in a caus al fashion to his fire
fighting.."
(Taken from Dr. Renzet ti f s"lette r of 8-28-86.) The
below quotes of the three reporting physician s would significantly
indicate the exposure to firefighti ng was mor e specifically the
cause of the applicants condition t han anythi ng else. Dr. Renzetti
in a letter of 9-17-86 states, "On the other hand, I am willing to
admit that I cannot rule out comple tely the p ossibility that his
asthma was induced by such a specif ic chemica 1 in the course of his
firefighting. Dr. Bronsky in a let ter of 2-1 8-87 states, "I agree
with Dr. Renzetti in his letter to Judge Sums ion that it was impossible to attribute his asthma to an y specific chemicals and on the
other hand, could not rule out the possibilit y that asthma was
induced by specific chemical contac t in the c ourse of his firefighting. Dr. Fink in a letter of 8-14- 8 7 s tates, " I , therefore, am of
the opinion that your progressive p ulmonary i mpairment was induced
by your recurrent exposure and inha lation of smoke and noxious
materials in your occupation. Whil e it is li kely that your asthma
was also initially induced by cat e xposure I believe it would not
have progressed to disability had y ou not bee n a firefighter.
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Further, although it cannot be determined with certainty, the
early inhalation of smoke, etc., may just as likely damaged
your airways so that your sensitivity to cats and subsequent
asthma was brought out clinically."
C Page 3) I "It is clear from Dr. Renzetti's reports that bronLine 17 | chia 1 asthma is not an occupational disease so far
as the cause o f the disease is concerned. 11
This statement
conflicts with the reports from all three physicians who
state:
"Nevertheless, I am willing to admit
Dr» Renzetti - 9-17-86.
that fundament ally we do not know the cause of asthma in general,
but there are known occupational causes of asthma and these are
tied to specif ic chemicals which are documented in current textbooks . "
ft
Dr. Bronsky - 2-1 8-87
It has been well established in the
literature tha t con tact wit h isocyanates and other chemi cals can
induce asthma and t hat repe ated exposure to these chemic als could
set up a conti nuing and eve n permanent disability after the exposure has been termi nate d if that exposure has been long and intense
enough to set up th e or igin al and continuing reaction".
Dr. Fink - 8 -14-8 7. "The medical literature reveals t hat airway
hyperactivity (an e ssen tial of asthma) can result from t he inhalation of smoke, noxi ous gase s or fumes (1) In fact a synd rome of
reactive airwa y dis ease fol lowing such inhalation exposu res has
been described and reco gniz ed since 1981 ( 2 ) * Such symp toms may
persist for ye ars,
Fur ther it has been documented in sh ort and
long term stud ies o f fire f ighters that pulmonary functi on (as
detected by ai rway reac tivi ty) decreases with exposure t o fire (3 &
4) and chronic expo sure is associated with a greater tha n normal
loss in pulmon ary f unc t ion (5 & 6)#
The experience of p hys ic ians
in our institu te is tha t some firefighters may develop p ersistant
hyperactive ai rway dise ase following smoke inhalation."
(Page 4)
Line 3

The Law Judge refers to a letter from Chief Hinman which
the applicant objects to as previously stated.

(Page 4) It is more important to give consideration to the evidence
Line 8
I provided in the applicants affidavit for sufficient weight
to this claim and allow additional evidence to support the facts
submitted with the Med Line Search materials*
Per the evaluation of
those materials by the experts in this field does show an appreciable
degree of objectivity.
(Page 4) I "When Mr. Jacobsen was first seen by Dr. Bronsky he was
Line 19 | quite ill and this necessitated the prescription of many
medications before certain tests could be performed".
This statement is incorrect as the medication I was prescribed was prescribed
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by Dr. Renzetti many years before I was seen by Dr. Bronsky.
They were the same medications I had been taking every day
since Dr. Renzetti prescribed them and on the day of my appointment with Dr. Bronsky I was no more "sick" than I was 4, 6, 8 or
10 months prior. Dr. Bronsky has never prescribed any drugs for
me.
The problem came from the medications I was taking which
interfered with the results of the tests so I had to stop taking
these medications to perform the tests accurately.
(Page 5)
t is more important to adopt the opinion of Dr. Fink
Line 32
as the best expert in this case as Dr. Bronsky refers to his
opinion wit h higher regard to occupational disease.
(Dr. Bronsky
in a letter to L. Zane Gill dated 2-18-87 states "I have suggested
to Mr. Jaco bsen that he contact Doctor Jordan Fink, an expert in
occupationa 1 asthma at the University of Wisconsin 11 . Dr. Fink
derived his opinion only in part from the Med Line material (that
was•develop ed by many experts and many years of study) as well as
his vast kn owledge and experience in this field. This would be
the most ob jectively defined documentation available.
(Page 5)
Line 37 | County policy dictat es that in t he instance of injury
the closest hospital would han die any of t he employees exposure.
Therefore Dr. Renzetti wasn't aware of the times I sought medical
treatment. In September of 19 86 after a 1 ong conversation and a
letter explaining the circumst ances only a t that time Dr. Renzetti
became aware that I had been e xposed to to xic smoke. Then he recognized that other facts shoul d be conside red in_this case. He
It was mentioned
submitted a letter to your att ention on 9- 17-87.
that my mother had asthma whic h is insigni ficant since there are
many ways to contract this ill ness. Her a ffliction occurred more
than a year after I became awa re of my con dition. To suggest ther
was a possible inherited link to my condit ion is totally irrelevan
(Page 6) The Law Judge's interpretation with the idea that I have
Line 2
I an underlying chronic pulmonary disease would suggest I
had the condition all my life. It would seem important to point
out here that I have been totally asymptomatic all my life until
the problem surfaced in 1979. The idea that I may have coccidiodomycosis came from Dr. Abunza possibly and was never diagnosed by
any physician which includes Dr. Renzetti. My condition has been
progressive one as pointed out by Dr. Fink, Dr. Bronsky, and Dr.
Renzetti. This fact must be addressed by the Law Judge.
(Page 6)
Line 8

There is no evidence or justification to impose the provisions of Section 35-2-50.
The Law Judge keeps referri
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to a statement by Dr. Renzetti that he "found" no medical or
scientific justification for attributing any of the applicants
impairment to an occupational disease. This statement was nullified by Dr» Renzetti himself in a follow-up letter of 9-17-86.
Further statements of the other two doctors not only point out
that my condition was aggravated but probably caused by my occupation
From a logical standpoint that after 15 years of being a firefighter
and the evaluation of the Medical Panel Testing that stated "This
testing in general did not confirm that he had significant allergic
diathesis which could have contributed to his asthma*
The cat reaction cannot be considered relevant as the underlying cause for
his asthma and its continuing problem*"
This would support the
cause due to firefighting rather than a congenital or underlying
problem*
This was also reiterated by Dr. Fink in his letter of
8-14-87.
The reduction of my permanent partial disability from 30% to 10%
in this case should be more of a medical consideration than a
determination of disability for the below mentioned reasons:

Especially, if my condition were considered to be a cause of many
years of service in fire combat and smoke exposure (which seems to
be appropriate per all supporting information mentioned) I would
request to be paid the full amount of permanent partial disability
indicated . .
IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE reconsider and amend the order of January 11, 1988 to award full payment
of permanent partial disability*
This request is made because this
medical disability (PPD) caused my total occupational disability and
involuntary medical retirement.
This disability was rated medically
as 30% of the whole man. In terms of disability it is evident that
I became more than partially disabled either by aggravation or direct
cause due to my duties as a firefighter.
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All evidence supports that the only cause of my condition
could have been caused by my occupation.
Therefore it is
appropriate to conclude that if any amount is attributable
to my occupation it would be that total amount indicated
by medical experts. It seems fair to arbitrarily give me
the benefit of the doubt and relate the full 100% of the
rated disability and award payment for that 30% permanent
partial rating.
In addition, please consider payment for temporary total
disability from 4-25-86 to 5-31-86 as compensable since
the Fire Department demanded I use sick leave and vacation
(when receiving the rating from Dr. Renzetti) until they
required me to take medical retirement.
There is no doubt that I will never be rehired as a firefighter because of my disability and handicap*
It is certain that my ratable disability caused me 100% unable to
perform in my trained profession*
I did not want this to
occur nor did I have any control over these events.

IN SUMMATION:
I appreciate the time, concern and effort of Administrative
Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion has shown in this case and do
respect his considerations. However th is information is
offered to clarify points I felt were n ot viewed in the
proper context. Over a period of two y ears many people spent
many hours on this case. The fact rema ins that due to a rated
disability of 30% I was forced to medic ally retire and considered incapable of performing my duties an d not allowed to pursue
my profession*
The most important issu e is that the cause of
my medical condition became evident aft er seven years of firecombat and exposures*
This would have never happened at all
due to the fact that an underlying cond ition or pre-existing
problem would have prevented me from en tering the Fire Department through pre-employment screening i n 1971. Annual followup examinations by the Fire Department did not show any medical
evidence of pre-existing problems or as thma until Dr. Renzetti
made that determination.

Sinp^rely,
lobi t
R J ^ tm

Jacob/en

CERTIFICATION OF MAILING:

I, Tracy Maxfield, certify that copies of this OBJECTION TO
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, dated January 11, 1988, was mailed to the parties listed below on January 27th, 1988:

Jay Stone, Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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50 West Broadway (4th Floor)
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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FIRE DEPARTMENT,
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During ray seventeen (17) year tenure on the Fire Department, I
have been actively engaged in fire fighting activities, with the exception
of the last two years where I was assigned to the Fire Prevention Bureau as
an investigator.
Generally, Salt Lake County leads the State of Utah for the most
fires, and averages theroostfires overall per year.
During my career, I have attended hundreds of fires in a firefighter capacity.
In the Salt Lake County Fire Department, all paramedics are
fire fighters. A paramedic's first responsibility when arriving at a fire
is to rescue fire victims and to attend the injured.

If there are none,

he would then proceed with fire suppression activities.
It is known that because of the extensive use of synthetics

EXHIBIT

in manufacturing foam, rubber, plastic pipes, beddinqr furniture, and
almost all interior household items, that virtually all structure fires
have isocyanate gases and many other toxic gases, oresent durhKf arid
after the burning process.

• . r •-

*

<• <

For the most partf these toxic gases are c»lpr^less^ocbrles§; £nd;
tastelessf thereforef being undetectable without the use of specialized
equipment.
Todayf it is common practice for fire fighters to use protective
breathing apparatus equipmentr however, this wasn't the case during the
first few years I spent on the job. Training in the use of this equipment was minimalr equipment often malfunctioned and "you were a sissy
if you didn't eat smoke like a man11 at the fire scene. Ihere were very
few precautions taken during these years. This was enhanced by the
extreme lack of knowledge and understanding of the hazards present
at these fires at that time.
FACTS
1.

My first 7 1/2 years on the fire department I had not used 1

hour of sick leave.
2.

When first hired on the fire department, you were considered

to be less than a man or a sissy if you wore an air pack into a fire.
It was "macho" to eat smoke.
3.

Air pack training when I was first hired was practically

non-existent and unprofessional. This may account for the reaon they
weren't worn very often. Rather than being "macho", the guys felt
inadequate and unskilled in the air pack application.
4.

I know I did.

Early on at Station 51 I ran, played basketball, etc. with

everyone else. I wasn't more or less winded than anvone else. My last

couple of years at Station 66, I seldom if at all participated in the
activities (racquetball, etc) due to my shortness of breath. ,
5.

Many times at Station 66, I was up during the niqht because of

breathing difficulties and wheezing.

Some of the guy$ in tfce: s-catitfnl

would comment on how weird my snorinq was.

I didn't smoke but I did

wheeze.
6.

My early childhood, adolescencef and as an adult that

included the first 9-10 years on the fire deoartment, there were no
signsf synptoras, or complications from any respiratory condition.
My activities were that of a normal person.
my body just like anyone else.

I ran and exerted

During this time, I was very involved

in various sportsf huntingf fishingf hiking, skiing, and basketball.
In high school, I was involved on the swiiraning, football, golff track
and baseball teams.
EXPOSURES
The* following are some of the incidences which caused ill
feelings and symptoms from exposure to fire conditions.

These are

in no way conclusive because the exposures have been many and are
hard to recollect.
During a fire involving the Trane Company Warehouse , I was
asked by my officers to take up a position on the leeward side of the
building.

I had a line and was to play a constant stream of water on

the burning building.

I was in this position a long period of time

without breathing apparatus and had to withdraw several tiroes because
of heavy smoke conditions.

There were many phosphorous explosions

during the burning stages of the fire.

After the firer I remember

experiencing dizziness, nausea, a throbbing headache and burning

sensation in my lungs.

I can't recall the date of t h i s incident other

than i t was early in my career.
On February 25, 1974, I attended a long burning f i r e in 4
;A ;vouny I

Holladay that was fed by a continuous supply of natural ga$,

boy escaped injury from running from the shower to exit the home.
After this incident, I recall a lightheaded ill feeling that caused me to
lay down after returning to the station to recover.
Sometime

in

1975

(I

believe)

at

a

residential

fire

where a James Snowden perished in his bedroomf I was involved
as

a

paramedic

to

enter

his

to

rescue

room

from

this
a

person.

ladder

house was fully involved in fire.

I

to

made

the

several

second

attempts

story.

The

I did finally enter his

room and located the victim but only after his demise

and was

subjected to extreme amounts of heat and smoke in spite of my
air pack.

After the fire I noticed some shortness of breathr

pain in my chest and disorientation.
laceration to my hand.

I had also sustained a

I received oxygen at the scene and

later was taken to Cottonwood Hospital by my partner Tom Bogle
for medical attention.

Later that night and the next day, I

coughed up a lot of black sputum.
On another occasion as a paramedic with Tom Boglef
we

were

called

South Salt Lake.
to

rescue

to

a

chlorine

gas

leak

at

a

chemical

plant

in

We both entered the plant with air packs

involved

workers

and

to

shut

off

the

leak.

After

the incidentr we both experienced burning eyes and skin, ill
feelings and discomfort.
that

shift

on

I also experienced wheezing.

another

call

we

had

to

pull

Later,
over

because

I

became nauseated and vomited.
On January 27, 1980, while involved in a f i r e of a .
fully

involved

residence

at

about

2800

Fiast

a roof cave in on top of me and smoke exhaustion.

3900

South, ' i

For t'm£di£:aT. ,".
•
t

I
•

« <• t
r
i
« • < «

had
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t
«

«

•
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treatment, I was taken to St. Mark's Hospital. What tlvev thought^* ' •' I
was a fracture of my neck turned out to be a oervical strain.
There were no prolonged effects from the smoke inhalation.
On July 14, 1980 , I was involved in a fire in South
Salt Lake at the Buehner Block plant.
with heavy smoke.

This was an intense fire

I ended up with walking pneumonia of both

lungs and off work for some time.

I was treated at

Cottonwood Hospital.
At a fire in South Salt Lake, Tom Bogle and myself
were first to arrive at a house fire call. We recognized
the problem and I was told of a fire in the bedroom of the
house. We proceeded to remove a burning mattress from this
house by carrying it out by hand.
packs.

This was done without air

There wasn't a lot of smoke in the house but as we

picked up the mattress, the smoke intensified.

We both became

ill from the smoke which in my case lasted for two to three
days afterwards. Neither of us went to seek medical
evaluations.
As I stated at the beginning of this Affidavit, my
exposures have been many.

I recall on many fires that afterwards

I spit up black tinged sputum. To isolate the incidences would be
almost impossible.

»

Robert Jacobsen appeared before me this

//

day of

September, 1987 and swore under oath that he fta& ,reac and « *
«
• «•*
understood the above affidavit and that the information

in it is true and correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief and as to those items set forth on information and
belief he believes them to be true.
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Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County
My commission expires 10 September 1989

Date
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No:

ROBERT JACOBSEN,

86000562

*

Applicant,

*
*
*
*
*
*

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY
(SELF-INSURED),

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Defendant.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On January 11, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the
applicant in the above-captioned case permanent partial impairment benefits.
The benefits were compensation for an aggravation of the applicant's*
pre^^sting br
ta.smo**1
The exposure to smoke occurred from 1971 to 1986 during which time the
applicant was employed as a firefighter with Salt Lake County. The applicant
was assessed by his treating physician. Dr. Renzetti, as having a 30% whole
person impairment due to his bronchial asthma. Per the Administrative Law
Judgefs Order, 0iis impairment rating takes into consideration both thej
applicant's pre-existing bronchial asthma resulting from an allergy to cattf
dander, as well as the aggr^vatip%. t<| his asthma caused^ h ^ his occupational
exposure to smoke*
Based on U.C.A. 35-2-50, the Administrative Law Judge determined it
was necessary to award permanent partial impairment benefits solely on that
impairment that was caused by the occupational exposure. Neither the medical!
panel, nor the two other doctors who had given their opinion regarding thrf
causal aspects of the applicant's impairment/ expressed numerically the]
breakdown between the pre-existing cause and the occupational cause of th«#
impairment}. In fact, all the expert medical opinions offered are purposefully
inconclusive regarding exactly how much the applicants occupational exposure
contributed to his overall lung impairment. Therefore, the Administrative Law!
Judge estimated the amount of impairment caused by the aggravation as bein^
0iie third_of athe overall impairment rated and based on ULGJU 35-2-50 awarded
permanent partial impairment benefits based on a 10% permanent partial
impairment.
On January 28, 1988, the applicant filed a Motion for Review
contesting the award of only one third of the permanent partial impairment
rated. The applicant argues he is entitled to the full 30% because had he
never been exposed to the smoke in his occupation, he would never have had to
medically retire. The applicant's entitlement to the full impairment rated is

EXHIBIT

ROBERT JACOBSEM
ORDER DENYING MOTION
PAGE TWO

the only issue on review. The Commission finds that the applicant's argument
on review would be a logical one if the issue were disability. Unfortunately,
the statute (U.C.A. 35-2-50) specifically states that only that impairment
resulting from occupational aggravation to a pre-existing disease can be
compensated. The medical evidence is quite clear that the only contribution
the occupational exposure to smoke had to the impairment was in the form of
aggravation to an already developed bronchial asthma caused by allergy.
Therefore, the full 30% is not occupational in origin and cannot be
compensated in full. As such, the applicant's Motion for Review must be
denied and the Administrative Law Judge's January 11, 1988 Order affirmed.

ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's January 28, 1988 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's January 11, 1988 Order
is hereby affirmed and final with further review to the Court of Appeals only
within the thirty (30) day time limit as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83.

Lktt

JUu^

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

Lenice L. Nielsen
Commissioner

John Florez
Commissioner

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
$T&
day of March, 1988.

'Linda J-/Strasburg
Commis^on Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March JL£-.
1988, a copy of the attached ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of ROBERT JACOBSEN was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

'Robert Jacobsen
8258 Williamsburg Park Circle
Sandy, UT 84070
L. Zane Gill
Attorney at Law
50 W. Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Jay Stone
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 south
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge
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Department of Medicine
Allergy-Immunology Section

Robert Jacobsen
8258 Williamsburg Park Circle
Sandy, Utah
84070
Dear Mr. Jacobsen:
I have reviewed the materials you sent me with your letter of July 28, 1987.
I have not obtained a personal health history directly from you nor have I examined you; I am, therefore, providing my opinion based on the medical records
and medical literature you have provided as well as my experience in the
diagnosis and treatment and my own information related to occupational asthma.
You have indicated that you had no history of allergic or other respiratory
disease other than childhood eczema when you began work as a firefighter in or
around 1970. In the course of your work, you were exposed to fire, smoke, and
a wide variety of burning chemicals, some of which may be toxic to the respiratory
system. The respiratory protection provided was either not used or apparently
was inadequate. You indicated to the University of Utah physicians that
about 1979 you began to notice runny nose and itchy eyes when you came in contact
with cats. From 1979 through 1982 your symptoms were year-around and then included
wheezing and occurred following/but not only with contact with cats. You had
been on Alupent, Theo-dur and were given Prednisone at times. You have been
followed at the University of Utah since 1982 for asthma and were also noted to
have chest-x-ray changes of cystic and granulomatous lung disease which was
diagnosed as old coccidiodomycosis. You were advised against scuba diving because
of the possibility of rupturing a lung cyst due to the pressure changes. You smoked
one pack of cigarettes per day for five years, quitting about 1970.
Initially your asthma was easily controlled, but by 1984 you required the
potent drug Prednisone for control. In May of 1986 you were considered permanently
partially disabled. It is of note that the University of Utah medical records do
not reflect a relationship between your occupation and your respiratory symptoms.
You were further evaluated by Dr. Bronsky in late 1986. At that examination
you indicated that you believed your occupation led to your asthma. Skin testing
revealed specific sensitivity to cat dander. Your pulmonary function in November
of 1986 revealed airway obstruction with only slight reversibility.

EXHIBIT
Milwaukee County Medical Complex
8700 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53226
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Robert Jacobsen
August 14, 1987
Page two
In Summary: You were well until 1979 when you developed symptoms of allergic
rhinitis and shortly thereafter asthma when in contact with cats. Your asthma
progressed over the next eight years until you became steroid dependent and
disabled. During that time you were a firefighter on active duty and had no
respiratory symptoms between 1970, when you began work, and 1979.
The medical literature reveals that airway hyperreactivity (an essential
of asthma) can result from the inhalation of smoke, noxious gases or fumes [1].
In fact, a syndrome of reactive airway disease following such inhalation exposure
has been described and recognized since 1981 [2]. Such symptoms may persist for
years. Further, it has been documented in short and long term studies of firefighters that pulmonary function (as detected by airway reactivity) decreases
with exposure to fire [3,4] and chronic exposure is associated with a greater
than normal loss in pulmonary function [5,6].
The experience of physicians in our institution is that some firefighters may
develop persistent hyperactive airways disease following smoke inhalation.
In reviewing your records, I am of the opinion that you have had allergic
respiratory disease with asthma related to cat dander sensitivity. However,
during the time of those symptoms, you were also exposed to smoke and noxious
materials in your occupation. It is unlikely that cat induced asthma would
progress to steroid dependent asthma (you have not indicated whether or not you
have had a cat at home during that time) and you were exposed on a regular basis
in your occupation to materials which can induce hyperactive airways and progressive pulmonary function deterioration.
I, therefore, am of the opinion that your progressive pulmonary impairment
was induced by your recurrent exposure and inhalation of smoke and noxious
materials in your occupation. While it is likely that your asthma was also initially
induced by cat exposure, I believe it would not have progressed to disability had
you not been a firefighter. Further, although it cannot be determined with
certainty, the early inhalation of smoke etc. may just as likely damaged your
airways so that your sensitivity to cat and subsequent asthma was brought out
clinically.
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to call me.
Sincerely,

Jordan N. Fink, M.D.
Professor of Medicine
Chief, Allergy-Immunology Section
JNF:mab

Robert Jacobsen
August 14, 1987
Page three
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L. Zane Gill, Attorney
Biele, Haslam & Hatch
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re: C. Robert Jacobsen
Dear Mr. Gill:

Robert Jacobsen was initially seen in my office at the end of 1986- As you
know, he came in concerning his claim for disability for his asthma. When
Mr. Jacobsen was first seen, he was quite ill which necessitated many medications including Theo-Dur 450 mg. every twelve hours; Prednisone 5 mg. twice
a day; Alupent as necessary, as well as Tagamet. You are well aware of his
prior history of asthma which has developed over several years having occurred many years after he was a fire fighter. His claim was that inhaling
smoke from fighting fires had led to his asthma and this was substantiated
by the fact that he never had problems for many years while he was initially
a fire fighter. He was evaluated by Doctor Attilio D. Renzetti at the University of Utah and I have very little more to add to his history that has
not already been contributed by Doctor Renzetti.
It was the opinion of Doctor Renzetti that a statement could not be made
supporting the fact that inhaling fumes caused his asthma, nor could it be
denied that this could be a cause. Occupational asthma is a very difficult
thing to prove short of actually challenging him with the toxic fumes that
he had inhaled.
When he was referred to my office at the suggestion of Doctor Renzetti, it
was stated that I was an allergy expert and could contribute by including,
or excluding allergy as an underlying cause. Due to the fact that Mr. Jacobsen was so ill, we were unable to initially test him. He did show significant reduction in his lung function with both a reduction in the large and
small airway flow rates. At one time, it seemed that it might be necessary
to draw blood tests for RAST evaluation to show that he may have an allergic
sensitivity that did contribute to his asthma syndrome. Finally, I was able
to get him adequately tested in December, 1986. He was tested for a panel
of allergens and was found to be essentially a non-allergic individual except
for a significant reaction to cat dander. This testing in general did not
confirm that he had significant allergic diathesis which could have contributed to his asthma. The cat reaction cannot be considered relevant as the
underlying cause for his asthma and its continuing problem.
I have suggested that Mr. Jacobsen contact Doctor Jordan Fink, an expert in
occupational asthma at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee. It is
possible that this expert, one of several in the country, could actually test
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him for isocyanates or other chemicals to determine the extent of their
participation in his asthma, I agree with the sentiments of Doctor Renzetti
in his letter of September 17, 1986 to Judge Sumsion that it was impossible
to attribute his asthma to any specific chemicals and, or the ether hand,
could not rule out the possibility that asthma was induced by so^o'fic
chemical contact in the course of his fire fighting. ^It h<«s oeenwP 1 !
established in the literature that contact with isocyanates and other chemicals can induce asthma and that repeated exposure to these chemicals could
set up a continuing and even permanent disability after the exposure has
been terminated if that exposure has been long and intense enough to set up
the original and continuing reaction.
I hope that the information that I have included in this letter will help
determine the possibility of the relationship of his asthma with the occupational exposures that Mr. Jacobsen claims. If there is any further information that I can give you, please feel free to contact me. Once again,
I must reiterate that I do not see any strong evidence that he has an allergic diathesis that could have contributed to this basic problem that he has.
His IgE (a blood level showing allergic antibodies) was within normal limits
for his age.
Sincerely yours,

Edwin A. Bronsky, M.D.
EAB:jp

y

INTERMOUNTAIN ALLERGY AND ASTHMA CLINIC
5 8 0 ' SOLTH- THIRD EAST
MURRAY L" AH 84107
P H O N E 266-4115

^ 5 G S C \ T H ~ E N T H EAST
S A L ' W A K E C : ~ Y w"TA* 5* 1Q2
PHONE 363-4071

> 4 9 S O L " r M 4 i 5 5 W E S T #3
^VES* VALLEV UTAH 84120
P H O N E 36*-868S

3860 J A C K S O N . AVENUE
O G D E N J " AH 64-405
=>KDNE 3 5 9 S 6 4 3

January 28, 1988
Re:

Robert Jacobsen

To Whom It May Concern:
In regards to the occupational disease claim
of Robert Jacobsen, I have no position that
disagrees with the disability given by Dr.
Attilio D. Renzetti regarding Mr. Jacobsens'
impairment ralating to his job of firefighting
exposure.
If you have any further questions please do not
hesitate to contact this office.

Edwin A. Brtfnsky, M.D

EAB/cv

EXHIBIT

Judge Richard G. Sumsion
RE: C. Robert Jacobsen/OD CI aim/Salt Lake County F i r t
September 17, 186

Page 2
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was also asthmatic". Thus, I must stand with my previous statement to you
about a family h i s t o r y of asthma, obviously only on Mr. Jacobsen's mother's
side of the family.
I did indicate to Mr. Jacobsen that s p e c i a l i s t s in a l l e r g y are more
expert i n the f i e l d of asthma and i t s causes and I might defer to a well
q u a l i f i e d experienced a l l e r g i s t in responding to questions of cause and effect
such as you have raised. I p a r t i c u l a r l y mentioned Dr. Bronsky, who is an
acknowledged expert a l l e r g i s t in our comnunity and whose opinion might be
helpful in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case.
I t r u s t t h i s may be of some help to you in your d e l i b e r a t i o n s .
be glad to t r y to answer any further questions you might have.

I shall

Sincerely yours,

A t t i l i o D. R e n z e t t i , J r . , M.D.
Professor of Medicine, Chief
Division of Respiratory, C r i t i c a l Care
& Occupational (Pulmonary) Medicine
ADR/jdg
cc:

C. Robert Jacobsen
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SCVCyft OF MEDICINE
DEPARTMENT Of INTERNAL MEDICINE
DIVISION OF RESPIRATORY. CRITICAL CARE
& OCCUPATIONAL (PULMONARY] MEDlClN

THE
UNIVERSITY
OF UTAH

MEDICAL C E / / &
50 NOBm ^5-piCAL DRIVE.
SALT^ AKf cjTYVJTAH 84132
801-5^1-J30dr. 7*07. 7437
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Chief Shirl Maxfield
51 West 3900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
RE:
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C. Robert Jacobsen

}

^.i L\ Salt

Dear Chief Maxfield:

(o.b.)
Late

C(h\ £ra ^ F ^

Mr. C. Robert Jacobsen has been a patient of mine since November 1st,
1982. At that time, he gave a history of approximately three years of
intermittent wheezing throughout the year and had had a diagnosis of bronchial
asthma made by a previous physician. Our evaluation confirmed the diagnosis
of bronchial asthma and I continued his therapy up until the present time. We
also found x-ray evience of probable healed coccidioidomycosis with extensive
cystic changes. At the time of my first evaluation of him, his asthma was
well controlled with the usual bronchodilator medication used in such cases.
However, since then, his condition has worsened so that he has now become what
we term a steroid dependent asthmatic which means that he requires daily
cortisone-type trea^merTt in order to keep his asthma under control. Thus, we
would classify him as being a severe asthmatic.
With regard to Mr. Jacobsen 1 s occupation, I would consider him totally
and permanently disabled from his occupation as a firefighter, although he
could work in an administrative position for the fire department which did not
involve any exposure to the smoke of firefighting. In addition, I would
consider him permanently partially disabled due to his underlying chronic
pulmonary disease (cystic changes and coccidioidomycosis). His symptoms and
the results of his pulmonary function tests and arterial blood gases after
exercise indicate a partial impairment of 30% of the whole jjian. This is a
Class 3 impairment according to AMA guidelines.
Sincerely yours,
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Attflio D. Renzetti, Jr., M.D.
Professor of Medicine, Chief
Division of Respiratory, Critical Care
& Occupational (Pulmonary) Medicine
AOR/jdg
cc:

Utah State Industrial Commission
Mr. C. Robert Jacobsen

EXHIBIT

,

Entwistle v. Wilkins, Utah, 626 P.2d 495 (1981), this
Court stated total disability does not mean "that the injured
employee must be unable to do any work at all."
The fact that an injured employee may be
able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional wages does not necessarily preclude
a finding of total disability to perform the
work or follow the occupation in which he was
injured. His tempory disability may be found
to be total if he can no longer perform the
duties of the character required in his
occupation prior to his injury.
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., 113 Utah 415,
427, 196 P.2d 487, 493 (1948). This compensation is not in the
form of damages for injury, as in tort action, but in the form of
payments to compensate for the loss of employability resulting
from injury. See, e.g., Northwest Carriers v. Industrial Commission,
Etc., 639 P2d 138 (1981); 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 57.11 (1983). Thus, the Utah worker's compensation
statutes key the amount of the weekly payment not merely to the
medical nature of the injury, but to a percentage of the worker's
average weekly wages, reflecting the ecomomic impact of the injury
on the on the particular individual.
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if by reason
of the disability resulting from his injury he cannot
perform work of the general character he was performing
when injured...
In accordance with the rule for reviewing findings of fact
made by courts and juries in judicial proceedings, the Court is
committed to the rule that the review under this section is
limited to the question of whether the commission in denying
compensation has arbitrarily or capriciously disregarded
uncontradicted evidence.
73, 12 P.2d 1112 (1932).

KeLlv v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah

PLEASE review Nolan Marshall case, addendum P38-45...

The Court can neither weigh nor review findings supported by
competent evidence since commissioners are sole judges of
credibility of witnesses and of weight of evidence.

Leventis v.

Industrial Commission. 84 Utah 174, 35 P.2d 770 (1934); Park Utah
Consolidated Mines Co., v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 481, 36
P.2d 979 (1934).
Northwest Carriers v. Industrial Commission, supra, at
141; Morrison-Knudsen Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 18
Utah 2d 390, 424 P.2d 138 (1967). It is the unique configuration
of these factors that together will determine the impact of the
impairment on the individual's earning capacity.
A few examples illustrate why this is so. Consider a
25-year-old court reporter who suffers a 20% hearing loss in a
work-related accident. His total physical impairment is slight,
but he is now unemployable in the proffession for which he is
trained. However, at 25 and in otherwise good health,he is an
excellant candidate for rehabilitation and retraining. He returns
to college and several years later is able to begin a new career
in a different field. The Commission could reasonably find a
temporary total disability followed by a permanent partial disability.
Oaden Union Railway & Depot
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 85 Utah 124, 38 P.2d 766 (1934);
Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981).
While an award cannot rest upon mere conjecture or
possibility, yet in reviewing a record every legitimate inference
which can arise from the evidence must be drawn in favor of an
employee where the commission has made findings and an award in
his favor.
conjecture.

There must be evidence, however, and not mere
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission. 75

Utah 220, 284 P. 313 (1929).
Inquiry of Court is limited to whether finding of industrial
commission has legal support in the evidence.

Park Citv v.

Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 205, 224 P. 655' (1924).

The Court, in reviewing acts of the industrial commission, is
limited to determination of whether the commission has exceeded
its powers or has disregarded some positive provision of law in
making or denying an award- - Utah Consolidated Mining Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 173, 240 P. 440 (1925).

Smith v. Carolina Footwear, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 460,274
S.E.2d 386 (1981). Confusion occurs when the word "disability" is
used to describe a medical condition more properly referred to as
"impairment" or "physical impairment." See Northwest Carriers v.
Industrial Commission, supra, at 140 n.3. For example, it would
have been more accurate if the above quotation had read: "[A]
workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of the impairment resulting from his injury he cannot perform work." However,
an undisputed physical impairment may not result in a disability.

The Court is not authorized to weigh conflicting evidence,
nor is it authorized to direct which one of two or more reasonable
inferences must be drawn from evidence which is not in conflict.
This is the peculiar province of the industrial commission.
Parker v. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 509, 5 P.2d 573 (1931);
Pace v. Industrial Commission. 87 Utah 6, 47 P.2d 1050 (1935).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Nolan W. Marshall,
Plaintiff,
v.
The Industrial Commission of
the State of Utah, Emery Mining
Co. (Employer), and/or the
State Insurance Fund of Utah,
and the Second Injury Fund,
Defendants.

No. 19153
F I L E D
April 5, 1904

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

DURHAM, Justice:
This case is a writ of review from the Industrial
Commission of the State of Utah. The appellant, Nolan W.
Marshall, was employed by the defendant, Emery Mining Company,
as a maintenance mechanic in a coal mine. On January 25,
1980, the appellant was leaving the mine in a minetrip, which
is a trailer with wooden seats pulled by a*tractor. The
minetrip rolled over a large lump of coal and the plaintiff
was bounced up and then down on the seat, injuring his back.
The appellant sought medical treatment on January 28, receiving medication for pain. He attempted physical therapy, but discontinued the treatment because of additional pain.
During this time the appellant continued to work, but stopped
in early March. On March 17, 1980, the appellant underwent
surgery, a two-space lumbar laminectomy, after a diagnosis
of acute lumbar disc. The operation was successful in reducinj
the appellant's pain, but in July the appellant's doctor noted
he was still in discomfort and recommended the appellant not
return to mine work. The appellant was then 67 years old.
The appellant received temporary total disability
payments from March 1, 1980, to November 14, 1980. On July 9,
1982, rhe appellant was notified that his application for rehabilitation training was denied by the Division of Rehabilitation Services because there was no "reasonable expectation that vocational rehabilitation services may benefit the
individual in terms of employability.,f In October 1982, a
medical panel reviewed the appellant's file and determined
that, he had sustained a 10% permanent physical impairment as
a result of the accident on January 25, 1980. The appellant had some previous physical impairment, and his combined impairment totaled 26%. The defendant State Insurance
Fund is liable for 10% of that rating; the defendant Second

Injury Fund is responsible for the remaining 16%. The findings
of the medical panel were adopted by the administrative law
judge, who denied permanent total disability status, but
awarded workmen's compensation benefits for the January 25,
1980 injury. The findings of fact stated that "it appears
to the Administrative Law Judge that [the appellant's] prime
reason for being unemployed at the present time is age father
than physical impairment." The defendant Industrial Commission
affirmed the order of the administrative law judge. The appellant seeks reversal of the ruling and a determination that
he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
In his brief the appellant asserts that the Industrial Commission erred in denying him permanent total disability benefits because of his age. He argues that the permanent total disability statute, U.C.A., 1953, S 35-1-67 (Supp.
1983), does not require his physical impairment to be the
primary factor in his disability. The defendants cannot point
to a statutory requirement in rebuttal, but argue that case law
establishes a pattern of a minimum percentage of loss of bodily
function necessary to support a decree of permanent total disability. The defendants cite cases affirming denials of benefits to employees whose percentage of disability was greater
than the appellantfs and conclude that a 26% impairment is insufficient for a determination of permanent total disability.
Furthermore, the defendants allege the evidence shows that the
appellant's January 1980 injury had little affect on his employability and that his decision to retire was voluntary.
At the outset, we note that the purpose of the
worker's compensation actg is "toBisecur_e__Kprkmen . . . ^gg-insjb
becoming objects of__chiLrJLty.fay,-making_reasonab.le.j5Pmpensatior
Tor" calamities incidental._tQ.jthe^employm^nt^ . . . ."
Henrie
vT^Rocky Mountain Packing Corp."/ J13 Utah*'4i5, 427, 196 P.2d
487, 493 (1948). This compensation is not in the form of
damages for injury, as in a tort action, but in the form of
payments to compensate for the loss of employability resulting from the injury. See, e.g. , Northwest Carriers v.
Industrial Commission, Etc., 639 P.2d 138 (1981); 2 Larson,
The Law of Workmen's Compensation S 57.11 (1983). Thus, the
Utah worker's compensation statutes key the amount of the weekly
payment not merely to the medical nature of the injury, but to
a percentage of the worker's average weekly wages, ^reflecting
the economic impact gf_tJie^injugy_on...the,particular individual,.
"See U.C.A., 1953, $S 35-1-66, -67 (Supp. 1983) /' "With'regard'
to permanent-total disability claims, this Court has stated:
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[A] workman may be found totally disabled
if by reason of the disability resulting
from his injury he cannot perform work of
the general character he jgas^performing
when in.iuredx or any otli^ii^Hoxlc^which-a
l^n^JLJbJls^j:apabili.tjies,.inay.,J)e .able_ Jtq_jdo
"or to learn to do . . . .
United Park City Mines Company v. Prescott, 15 Utah 2d 410, 412,
393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (1964) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Disability is the loss of ability to earn. See, e.g., Ashley
v. Blue Bell Inc., Ala. Civ. App., 401 So. 2d 112 (1981);
Smith y. Carolina Footwear, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 460, 274 S.E.2d
386 (1981). Confusion occurs when the word "disability" is
used to describe a medical condition .more properly referred
to as "impairment" or "physical impairment." See Northwest
Carriers v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 140 n.3. For
example, it would have been more accurate if the above quotation had read: M[A] workman may be found totally disabled
if by reason of the impairment resulting from his injury he
cannot perform work." However, an undisputed physical impairment may not result in a disability. See, e.g., Matthews
v. Industrial Commission, Colo. App., 627 P.2d 1123 (1980)
(when a loss of taste and smell does not affect employability,
there can be no award for disability); Tafoya v. Leonard
Tire Co., 94 N.M. 716, 616 P.2d 429 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)
(nondisabling pain is not compensable because physical impairment is not the same thing as disability); Winn Dixie
Stores, Inc. v. Linthicum, Fla. App., 376 So. 2d 909 (1979)
(a lump on the side resulting from a work-related injury
did not diminish the claimant's earning capacity and thus an
award of disability benefits was improper).
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, but
in terms of the specific individual who has suffered a workrelated injury. An injury to a hand would not cause the same
degree of disability in a teacher, for example, as it would
in an electrician. Thu.s. in assessing the loss._o_f_.earning .
capacity, jt constellation of factors must be considered, only
one of which "is the physical impairment. Other factors are,
lage, education, training and mental capacity. See Northwest
"Carriers v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 141; MorrisonKnudsen Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 18 Utah 2d 390,
424 P.2d 138 (1967). It is the unique configuration of these
factors that"together will determine the impact of the impairment on the individual's earning capacity.
A few examples illustrate why this is so. Consider
a 25-year-old court reporter who suffers a 20% hearing loss in
a work-related accident. His total physical impairment is
slight, but he is now unemployable in the profession for which
he was trained. However, at 25 and in otherwise good health,
3-
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he is an excellent candidate for rehabilitation and retraining.
He returns to college and several years later is able to begin
a new career in a different field. The Commission could reasonably find a temporary total disability followed by a permanent partial disability. On the other hand, if the court
reporter had been 60 when his hearing impairment occurred, his
prospects for retraining would not be favorable. Depending on
his health, mental capacity and other experience, his 20% loss
of hearing could be the basis for finding him totally disabled,
i.e., unemployable as a result of his impairment. In contrast,
the heavy equipment operator who suffers the same hearing
loss may experience little, if any, loss of wage earning capacity. Thus, total disability does not mean total physical
impairment. In Entwistle v.ffilkins,Utah, 626 P.2d 495 (1981),
this Court stated total__ilis.ability does not meaji "tjhat the
injured employee must be Jinable—fco_do,-gCny-.workJat alL.7
The fact that an injured employee may be
able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional wages does not necessarily preclude a finding of total disability to
perform the work or follow the occupation
in which he was injured. His temporary
disability may be found to be JEotal if he
<5ah"no longer perform the duties of the,
character required in his .occupation prior
to his injury..
Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Some employees, although disabled with regard to their pre-injury
occupation, may be rehabilitated and employed again. U.C.A.,
1953, S 35-1-67 requires that the employee must cooperate
with the division of vocational rehabilitation and that the
division must find that the employee may not be rehabilitated
befpxfi the Industrial Commission can order permanent total
"disability benefits.
Some employees, however, cannot be rehabilitated
and even though not in a state of abject helplessness "can
no longer perform the duties . . . required in [their] occupation^]. " Entwistle, supra, at 498. These employees fall into
the so-called "odd-lot" category.
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in virtually every jurisdiction,
total disability may be found in the case
of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped
that they will not be employed regularly in
any well-known branch of the labor market.
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2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation $ 57.51 at 10-164.24
(1983) (footnote omitted). Whether or not an employee falls into
/the odd-lot category depends on whether there is regular, dependable work available for the employee who does not rely on the
[sympathy of friends or his own superhuman efforts. Once the
'employee has presented evidence that he can no longer perform
/the duties required in his occupation and that he cannot be reJhabilitated, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the
A existence of regular, steady work that the employee can perform, taking into account the employee's education, mental
capacity and age. 2 Larson, supra, 10-164.51 to 10-164.54
, and cases cited.
I
A considerable number of the oddflot cases involve claimants whose adaptability to the new situation created by
Itheir physical injury is constricted by
/lack of mental capacity or education.
/This is a sensible result, since it is
J a matter of common observation that a man
\ whose sole stock in trade has been the
! capacity to perform physical movements,
I and whose ability to make those movements
u has been impaired by injury, is under a
| severe disadvantage in acquiring a depend\able new means of livelihood.
Id. at 10-164.54 to 10-164.63 (footnotes omitted). A majority
of the odd-lot cases are concerned with employees whose work
required physical labor, and many of those employees were 50
years old or older with moderate or little education. See, e.g.,
Halstead Industries v. Jones, Ark. App., 603 S.W.2d 456 (1980)
(affirming total permanent disability benefits to a 59-yearold illiterate laborer with a 15% physical impairment);
Laughlin v. City of Crowley, La. App., 411 So. 2d 708 (1982)
(54-year-old sanitation worker with little education who was
unable to return to heavy labor found totally and permanently
disabled under "odd-lot" doctrine when employer was not able
to show that there was work available); Matter of Compensation
of Livesay, 55 Or. App. 390, 637 P.2d 1370 (1981) (affirming
total disability benefits to 43-year-old laborer with a seventhgrade education and no special skills whose injuries left him
with restricted movement, limited strength and an inability
to sit or stand for any length of time); Smith v. Asarco, Inc.,
Tenn., 627 S.W.2d 946 (1982) (affirming award of total disability benefits to 65-year-old miner with a sixth-grade education who was physically able to do sedentary work in a clean
environment). As stated above, once the employee has demonstrated his impairment and presented evidence that he is no
longer capable of performing his former work and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the burden shifts to the employer to
-5-
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show that regular work is available. In Brown v, Safeway
Stores, Inc., 82 N.M. 424, 483 P.2d 305 (1970), the court of
appeals stated: "It is much easier for the [employer] to
prove the employability of the [employee] for a particular
job than for the [employee] to try to prove the universal
negative of not being employable at any work.M Ld. at 427,
483 P.2d at 308. See also Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. Industrial Commission, 25 Ariz.
App. 117, 541 P.2d 580 (1975); Transport Indemnity Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 157 Cal. App. 2d 542, 321
P.2d 21 (1958); Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund,
98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977); Hill v. U.S. PlywoodChampion Co., 12 Or. App. 1, 503 P.2d 728 (1972).
This Court may set aside the Commission's award
if the Commission's findings of fact do not support the award.
U.C.A., 1953, S 35-1-84. In the instant case, the appellant
is a miner with less than a high school education who has a
40-year history of heavy labor in the mines. He presented
uncontroverted evidence of his impairment, his inability to
perform the work required by his job and the opinion of the
division of vocational rehabilitation that he could not be
rehabilitated. He also testified that prior to his injury he
had fully intended to continue to work rather than to retire.
Thus, the appellant presented a prima facie case that he falls
into the odd-lot category. The defendant Commission did not
require the defendant employer to demonstrate the availability
of regular work the appellant could perform, nor did any of the
defendants present evidence indicating that the appellant had
any reasonable wage earning capacity. As we have discussed,
benefits are awarded on the basis of disability, not physical
impairment. It appears the Commission's award in this case
rested almost entirely on the size of the appellant's percentage of impairment and on the fact that appellant was eligible
to retire, rather than on evidence of the appellant's wageearning capacity.
Therefore, we find that the denial of permanent total
disability benefits is unsupported by the Commission's findings
of fact, and we reverse. We remand this matter to the Commission
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, which
may include further evidence on the question of disability
as defined herein or merely a recomputation of benefits based
on total disability at the discretion of the Commission.
Costs are awarded to the appellant.
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WE CONCUR:

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

HALL, Chief Justice:

Dallin H. Oaks, Justice

(Dissenting)

Plaintiff's contentions of error attack the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order of the Commission*
This Court's standard of review in such cases is-as was recently stated in Kaiser Steel Corp, v. Monfredi:
[T]he reviewing court's inquiry is whether
the Commission's findings are "arbitrary
and capricious" or "wholly without cause"
or contrary to the "one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or without "any
substantial evidence to support them."
Only then should the Commission's findings
be displaced. [Bracketed language in
original.]
The record before us contains substantial evidence
to support the conclusion reached by the Commission that plaintiff's 26 percent permanent partial impairment rating did not
rise to the level of permanent total disability simply because
it occurred at a time when plaintiff was 69 years of age and
elijgible for retirement.
Following plaintiff's injury and subsequent surgery,
his condition improved, and his doctor considered him ready
for work. Both the medical panel and the attending physicians
were in agreement that plaintiff's condition had stabilized
and that he was free from pain. The medical panel also observed that plaintiff's "upper extremity motion was normal
for age." Furthermore, plaintiff was performing yard work
and other household tasks.
Plaintiff's injury occurred in January of 1980, and
Dr. Lamb followed his condition closely over the next few
months. On August 27, 1980, he observed: "He [plaintiff]
did heavy work in the mine and probably shouldn't return to
this for a couple to three months yet." During a subsequent
examination, plaintiff advised Dr. Lamb that he was "in the
process of retiring."
The record adequately supports the conclusion that
plaintiff's decision to retire was voluntary and the natural
TI Utah, 531 P.2d 888 (1981).
-7-
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result of his age rather than his inability to perform further
work. His doctor simply suggested that he retire because of
his age, and he did so. Plaintiff testified that miners customarily retire between the ages of 60 and 70. He further
testified that upon his retirement he became the recipient of
social security retirement benefits (as distinguished from
disability benefits) and that he was also receiving a Dension
from his labor union.
I would affirm the order of the Commission.

Howe, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Hall.
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